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Abstract 
This paper develops the first applied econometric model to examine the 
efficiency of existing enforcement measures and legal framework on 
prevailing software piracy rates in Egypt. Hence, it can be used as a tool 
when discussing new policies concerning the welfare of the interest groups 
and the pricing of protected software products (i.e., original software 
products). The model will focus on the available time-series data during 
1992-2002 in Egypt. This time period was chosen due to the paucity of 
quantitative data concerning the model. The institutional environment is 
examined according to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to illustrate 
the legal framework, the informal constraints and the enforcement 
authorities to support the empirical model. Analytical results show that 
efficient enforcement of property rights does not only imply increasing legal 
enforcement through imposing more severe punishments and prosecutions, 
as decreasing the prices of software plays a much bigger role. Thus relying 
on legal enforcement authorities alone is not always economically optimal, 
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     1. Introduction
* 
The importance of counterfeiting copyright piracy in the economic and social 
development of Egypt has been on a rising trend. Different methodologies for estimating 
piracy and evaluating the enforcement efforts were suggested. However the lack of data 
and the unique nature of intellectual property (IP), specifically copyright industries and 
hence different forms of piracy restricted the government to rely on pure theoretical 
models and implement some simple statistical techniques. This paper develops the first 
applied econometric model to examine the efficiency of existing enforcement measures 
and legal framework on prevailing piracy rates and hence on the welfare of the interest 
groups and the pricing of protected products in Egypt during 1992-2002. The Egyptian 
software market will be the main focus of the study, as it produces copyright products 
(software) and ranks among the main growth sectors in Egypt (Ghoneim, 2004). This 
time period was chosen due to the paucity of quantitative data before 1992 concerning 
Egyptian copyright industries. In addition, the data representing piracy rates and the 
amount of losses due to piracy after 2002 were collected using a different methodology 
which could lead to misleading results if used. Many interviews to gather data on piracy 
and its impact on the Software Market are carried out. Data on the micro level are used to 
measure the perception of the market players on the size of the problem. The institutional 
environment designed to protect software products is examined according to the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) to illustrate the legal framework, the informal constraints 
and the enforcement authorities to support the empirical model.  
 
Actually, Egypt – as most of the developing countries – suffers from an inefficient 
institutional environment of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protection in general and 
copyright protection in specific. People are not really aware of the concept of copyright 
infringement and its impact on the society. Some authorities claim that IPR infringement 
creates additional value added
1 to the Egyptian economy; however it has a lot of negative 
effects on Egypt and its relation with the outside world. Piracy harms both foreign as well 
as Egyptian Software companies (Corea, 2003). Most firms working in the field of 
Software development do not suffer from great losses due to weak IPR enforcement in 
Egypt, due to the fast advancements in the field of IT that make pirated software obsolete 
by the time new programs are available in the market. Even though, piracy becomes a 
major threat for firms working in the field of pure software (ready made packages). 
Especially agencies for multinational producers of software as Microsoft are highly 
affected by software piracy. In addition, it can be said that reductions in software piracy 
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1 It allows protected products to be sold at prices equal to the marginal cost (MC) of producing an extra unit 
of the product, it also creates Network externalities and finally it increases worldwide acceptance of the 
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might lead to a faster growing IT sector which can help jumpstart delayed economies, 
create new economic opportunities, and help economies become more productive.
2  
 
The study comprises two main parts. Part one investigates the institutional environment 
designed to protect copyrights in Egypt according to the NIE with the main objective of 
arriving at concrete policy recommendations on how to have better utilization of the 
existing protection system and how to upgrade it for the enhancement of attracting more 
investments and encourage domestic production of software products in Egypt. For this 
purpose, the study introduces in the second part a simple model to examine the economic 
impact of enforcement measures and its consequences on software piracy rates and hence 
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   2. The Institutional Environment Protecting Copyrights in Egypt 
 
Once intellectual property has been exposed via the granting of some type of 
authorization to access, it becomes necessary to protect it from unauthorized use or 
access caused by copyright pirates (Maskus, 1998a & 1998b). Wrong pricing policies and 
the low marginal cost of reproduction usually increase the probability of piracy. Watt 
(2002) extends this definition by pointing out that copyright infringement occurs when 
some kind of use is made of the copyright, for which the copyright holder’s approval was 
required to but was not obtained. For example, a royalty was due, but was not paid. Thus 
copyright infringement can be considered a typical case of free riding on a public good 
and hence a legal framework accompanied by efficient enforcement is needed in order to 
protect these products. 
  
The Egyptian copyright industry has already established an institutional environment that 
protects its copyright industries. The only problem concerns the efficiency of the 
elements of such environment and whether they suit the Egyptian case or not. 
 
According to the New Institutional Economics (NIE), “improving the performance of 
economies requires the existence of efficient institutions” (North, 1990).  Institutions are 
made up of three main elements: formal rules, informal rules or constraints and 
enforcement characteristics of the former two elements.  
 
The formal rules (statue law, common law, regulations) can be easily altered; however 
the informal rules (norms of behavior, self imposed codes of conduct) may change only 
gradually (Sened, 1997). Thus, a revolutionary change might not result in revolutionary 
outcomes as expected. In other words norms of behavior and ethics must accompany any 
set of formal rules. In other words they are considered vital to legitimize any law. 
Accordingly Third World economies imitating some formal rules of successful Western 
economies with different cultures and ethics failed to develop. Countries adopting the 
same formal rules should not expect to have similar performance characteristics, due to 
the fact that they have different informal norms and enforcement characteristics. In other 
words it can be said, that the transfer of formal political and economic rules of successful 
developed countries to developing countries is not a sufficient condition for a similar 
good economic performance (North and Thomas, 1996). 
 
Thus the coming section of the paper tackles the three above-mentioned elements of the 
institutional environment protecting the Egyptian copyright industries in details.  
 
2.1 Copyright Laws in Egypt 
 
Generally, copyright laws provide rules that prohibit any infringement action without 
permission from the author himself. The main purpose of the law is not only to deter 
pirates but also punish such behavior (Corea, 2003). 
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Egypt is one of the first countries to adopt a modern IPR system in the Middle East and 
Africa. It adopted a modern trademark law in 1939, patent law in 1949, and copyright law 
in 1952. Egypt is a member of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works (September 9, 1886) and the protection in Egypt is consistent with the 
terms set out by that treaty. The first Egyptian Copyright law, law number 354 for the 
year 1954, is amended by several laws: Law 430 of 1955; Law 14 of 1968; Law 13 of 
1971; Law 34 of 1975; Law 102 of 1980; and Law 38 of 1992 (Hamza, 1996). 
 
Law 38 of 1992 is an extension of the first law and its several amendments to include for 
the first time innovative technology, such as: software, databases and other computer 
related applications. Thus, the copyright law extended its protection from the basic 
copyright products (applied arts, compositions, written works, etc.) to the latest in 
computer works. It also included relatively higher deterrent penalties for infringers. 
3 
Egypt actually passed what were essentially TRIPS
4 compatible amendments to its 
copyright law. However, the failure to impose deterrent penalties has driven to put Egypt 
on the “Priority Watch List” set up by the 1988 US Trade Act. As a result, law 29 of 
1994 emerged to replace law 38 of 1992. This law ensured that computer works are 
treated exactly as literary works. It has also set out the personal use exemption and has 
limited it to individuals who copy for personal use only and not any commercial 
purposes. Copying for use in business is illegal, but so is the copying for the use of 
another Person. The distribution of videotapes, audiotapes, and computer software was 
regulated to ensure their performance only by authorized agents (Ministry of Interior, 
2003). 
 
Egypt has long been noted as a closed market to US right holders, due to the high 
prevailing piracy rate. As a result it risks losing the tariff benefits it enjoys under the US 
Generalized System of Preferences, if its IPR laws are assessed inadequate
5 (IIPA, 2003). 
 
All this has led Egypt to legislate its new IPR law. Law 82 of 2002 provides a firm basis 
for the protection of intellectual property rights in general and copyrights in specific, and 
allows for immediate enforcement against pirates. This law provides protection for all 
forms of authored works and it also includes software products, starting from the date of 
publication and generally ends 50 years after the author’s death. In short, this law gives 
the author the right to license or deprive the use of his work through copying, selling, 
renting, or disseminate it through the Internet or computer networks. Under this new law 
the author’s right is protected by both, civil and criminal legislatures. The criminal 
process involves accusing the infringer and punishing him by a possible 3 years jail 
sentence or a L.E. 5,000-10,000 fine per work copied or both, for first-time offenders 
depending on the seriousness of the alleged infringement. For second-time infringers, a 
minimum of 3 months in prison and a fine of at most L.E.50.000 will then be a must.  
The copyrighted material caught and copying equipments will be confiscated and the 
place of pirating will be shut down. Nevertheless, the civil process involves a lawsuit for 
                                                 
3 Personal communication of the author with Ms. Ghada Khalifa, head of the BSA office in Cairo. January, 
2003. 
4 Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
5 As it is the prevailing case with china, with 100% tariffs on its trade with the US.   - 5 -
the damage by the owner of copyright. This includes a financial compensation for the 
right holder that reaches up to millions of Egyptian pounds (Ministry of Justice, 2003). 
 
It can be noticed that there has been lots of improvements concerning the Egyptian 
copyright laws, but it must be said that there is still room for greater improvements 
concerning the fine imposed and sentence spent to be able to deter pirates.  
 
 
2.2 Informal Rules and Ethics concerning the Egyptian Copyright Industries 
 
As mentioned before, the informal rules are essential to legitimize any set of formal rules. 
Combating piracy often requires a fundamental culture shift in the way people view 
pirated products. To reduce piracy, governments should increase public awareness of 
copyright laws, encourage legal use of legitimate copyright products and explain the cost 
of piracy. 
 
However, before doing so, the government itself should send a clear message showing 
that they really want to abolish piracy. Especially in the field of software piracy, since the 
Egyptian government and government agencies were accused to be one of the largest 
users of pirated software. 
 
Many countries have launched new efforts to manage their software resources. Countries 
like China, Spain, Taiwan, Ireland, Colombia, Jordan, Thailand, the Czech Republic, and 
Paraguay, among other nations, have issued software management policies, through 
conducting internal audits and ensuring that they are using only authorized software. 
They have issued new policies that serve as a catalyst for greater software protection in 
both the public and private sectors. Thus, governments are those who should lead such 
campaigns of combating piracy. Leading, for example is a crucial element for making the 
fundamental culture shift that can lead to the effectiveness of formal rules and regulations 
(Mansfield, 1994). 
 
However this is not enough, education and media play a major role for promoting respect 
for intellectual property. Many countries already have conducted successful public 
education campaigns underway. Taiwan is an example; they declared 2002 as “Action 
Year for IPR Protection” and sent letters to all businesses, suggesting a course of action 
for protecting against illegal use of software. Egypt began its anti piracy campaign, since 
the beginning of year 2000 in cooperation with the BSA office in Egypt. They have 
produced songs with video-clips emphasizing religious aspects, explaining the process of 
piracy and showing its negative effects on the right-holders (creative mind), on 
employment and on the society as a whole. They also show how pirated products may 
harm their users. They have shown all this in a way that is understandable for all 
segments and for all ages of the society.  
 
The Egyptian government has also signed several agreements with software companies to 
decrease the prices of legitimate software, as to bring the prices of legitimate products 
close to the pirated ones. Hence to get rid of one of the main reasons of copyright piracy, 
this is the relatively low price of pirated products.  
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Governments and industries should work together to launch comprehensive educational 
campaigns to reduce piracy. They can appeal to the public and business owners to adopt 
proper guidelines for using legal products and remind them of the legal liabilities and 
potentially high cost of piracy.  
 
 
2.3 Enforcement Characteristics of Formal and Informal Rules 
  
The existence of a formal set of rules represented in a countries copyright law and the 
informal rules aiming at changing the ethics and educational background of a society 
concerning pirated products are just two elements of an efficient institutional 
environment. As without some strong enforcement characteristics of both these two 
elements become non effective. 
 
Enforcement is usually carried by a third party that practices the existing law and 
punishes whoever tries to break it. This third party enforcement may be practiced by 
formal (police or other government officers, as inspectors) and informal organizations 
(syndicates). But it is usually the formal organizations that have the authority to practice 
enforcement in an effective way. Weak intellectual property in developing countries is 
mainly due to the absence of efficient governmental enforcement of the law (Leafer, 
1991). 
 
Copyright laws in Egypt are generally enforced by two major pools, the Department of 
Anti-piracy Police affiliated to the Ministry of Interior and the Censorship Unit, affiliated 
to the Ministry of Culture. But this does not mean that these are the only two authorities, 
responsible for detecting infringements. There exist three other major police departments, 
which started to arrest pirates even before the Egyptian copyright law was issued. These 
are:  Public Money Police Authority, Tax Evasion Combat Authority and General Police 
of Supply and Internal trade.  
 
The main difference between the three above mentioned police departments and the two 
major enforcement pools is that the two pools are especially formed to enforce the 
copyright law and to protect the authors rights unlike the other three which combat 
piracy, serving different means and protecting different rights. 
 
 
The Censorship Unit, affiliated to the Ministry of Culture 
 
This department includes a special art inspection unit. This unit is responsible for giving 
licenses to performing artists and doing regular inspections on Cinemas, hotels, firms, 
and stores renting or selling videotapes, tapes, CDs, or computers. This unit comprises 20 
inspectors that are responsible for chasing the raids all over Egypt. They have a head-
office located in El-Kasr El-Ainy in Cairo. Table 2.1 shows the number of copyright- 
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Table 2.1: The number of copyright-infringement cases 
caught by the Censorship Unit (1990-2001) 
 














Source: Department of Art Products affiliated to the Ministry of Culture, 
(Unpublished Data), 2003. 
 
From the table mentioned above, it is obvious that starting from 1999, the raids increased 
dramatically, but inspectors working at the unit made it clear that their number of 
inspection per month increased, too since mid 1990s. The high profits gained by pirates 
since mid 1990s, encouraged many people to enter the market of pirated products, as the 
revenues obtained from pirating exceeds its costs.
6 The inspection unit has registered a 
case were 500 CDs were caught and the pirate was accused and had to pay a 
L.E.1.5million according to the Egyptian copyright law. However by one way or the 
other, the pirate managed to reduce the fine to L.E.5000. This of course reduces his costs 
and encourages other pirates to continue their successful business.  
 
Pirates or sellers and distributors of pirated copies caught by the inspection unit are then 
to be handed to the second major enforcement pool, which is the Anti-Piracy police 
department affiliated to the ministry of interior and are then to be kept in prison until the 
attorney sets them free or they are kept until trial (this rarely happens). 
 
 
The Anti-Piracy Police Department, affiliated to the Ministry of Interior 
 
This enforcement unit was established in May, 1996. Before this, the unit was part of 
another ministry, the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade. It was separated in 1996 to 
form an independent unit affiliated to the Ministry of Interior, as a result of the increasing 
danger of piracy. The headquarter office is located in Mogamaa El-Tahrir and it 
comprises 4 to 5 officers.  It also has 1 or 2 officers in each city all over Egypt. This new 
enforcement unit has lots of functions, as follows: 
                                                 
6 Personal communication of the author with Mr Mahmoud Agami, inspector of the Censorship unit, 
affiliated to the Ministry of Culture. February, 2003.   - 8 -
 
 
   Set a plan to protect the different forms of cultural creations, in a way that     
guarantees efficient provision of the authors’ rights.  
   Implement the rules set by international conventions. 
   Identify all locations of copying, dealing and distributing illegal copyright 
products and conduct investigations about these locations to take the legal 
procedures confronting these actions.  
   Stay in contact with organizations (public and private) performing legal activities 
to ensure their commitment to the copyright law. 
   Receive complains from right holders and take the required legal procedures to 
defend their rights. 
 
Table 2.2: The number of infringement cases 
caught by the police (1997-2003) 
 








Source: Ministry of Interior, (Unpublished Data), 2003. 
 
From the above table, it is obvious that the number of piracy cases registered by the 
ministry of interior is much larger that the cases registered by the Inspection unit 
affiliated to the ministry of culture. This is due to the fact that the police register almost 
every case the inspection unit catches, but the inspection unit does not count the cases 
caught by the police alone. This, thus, explains the huge number registered by the police. 
Besides, inspectors stressed on the fact that every policemen, is assigned a minimum 
number of cases. This minimum number should be achieved by one way or another. 
Thus, they may include false alarms.
7 
 
All this sheds light on the deficiencies of the two major enforcement pools.  The limited 
number of police officers responsible for copyright enforcement is not only responsible 
for deterring piracy but also prostitution cases and other kinds of cases. Besides, they 
have to work on whatever is most important to the ministry of interior on any particular 
day.  High staff turnover in the Anti-Piracy Police Department allows insufficient time 
for officers to gain the experience and knowledge necessary to carry out their functions 
effectively.  The assigned number of cases for every police officer is three cases per 
                                                 
7 Personal communication of the author with Mr Mounir Mansour, inspector of the Censorship unit, 
affiliated to the Ministry of Culture. February, 2003.    - 9 -
month. The government is only concerned about the quantity and not the quality of cases 
registered in their documents.
8  
Inspectors of the Censorship Department do not receive information from the 
product/companies registration division within the same department on a regular basis. 
This would have helped them to easily identify pirated products. Besides, inspectors are 
not provided with transportation by the Censorship Department and have to use public 
transport hampering their ability to confiscate the pirated products they find.  Another 
criticism is that whereas copyright pirates usually work at night, policemen and 
inspectors raid the suspected sites by day.
9 
 
A further major drawback of the Egyptian enforcement system is due to the deficiencies 
of the Egyptian judicial system. The system suffers from delays in the judicial process. 
Years may pass until the claimant receives the verdict of his case.  Due to the long 
delays, the cost of bringing the case to court increases the cost to the claimant 
dramatically. Thus, claimants might prefer not to suit the pirate, as the cost and time 
spent on the case would exceed the expected compensation they would get. The judicial 
system in Egypt suffers from the lack of experienced judges in the field of copyrights, 
underestimating, in turn, piracy cases. The reduced fines, imposed by the judges are 
therefore not deterrent and reduce the cost of pirates.  
   
Accordingly it can be said, that the major authorities responsible for enforcing the laws as 
well as the Egyptian judicial system still do not tackle piracy cases in a serious way. They 
still do not realize the importance of IPR protection. That is why further training courses 
should be provided to police officers and judges to create more efficient enforcement 
agencies. The Egyptian government has already begun to realize the threat of piracy on 
one of Egypt’s most important copyright industry, which is the software industry. As a 
result, two main decisions were taken recently by the Egyptian government to ensure the 
efficiency of enforcing copyrights concerning computer software. The Ministry of 
Information and Communication shall take over the responsibility of protecting 
copyrights concerning computer software. Also, a special unit for detecting computer 
crimes has been established in the information and registration office. This unit is directly 
affiliated to the ministry of interior. According to these efforts, Egyptian piracy rates are 
expected to fall beyond expectations. 
 
                                                 
8Personal communication of the author with Ms. Ghada Khalifa, head of the BSA office in Cairo. January, 
2003. 
 
9 Personal communication of the author with Mr. Amr El-Nebeei, manager of the EHE Company (EHE is a 
reputable Egyptian video taping company). January, 2004.   - 10 -
 
   3. Software Piracy in Egypt 
3.1 An Overview 
 
Despite the fact that piracy activities crate additional value added to the Egyptian 
economy, it has a lot of negative effects on Egypt and its relation with the outside world. 
Piracy harms both foreign as well as Egyptian Software companies. Firms working in the 
field of Software development do not suffer from great losses due to weak IPR 
enforcement in Egypt. The fast advancements in the field of IT make pirated software 
obsolete by the time new programs are available in the market. Even though, piracy 
becomes a major threat for firms working in the field of pure software (ready made 
packages). Especially agencies for multinational producers of software as Microsoft are 
highly affected by software piracy.  
 
Imports from the U.S. cover 64% of the local IT market in Egypt. The Computer services 
sector was ranked as the fourth opportunity sector for American business in Egypt in 
2001-2002. Losses due to piracy which affect only the US computer software publishers 
in 2002 are estimated to be $12.7 million at a rate of 52% for business software 
applications, while the piracy rate concerning the entertainment software reached 90%. 
These measures differ from the total losses experienced by all software publishers in 
Egypt (including US publishers) which was estimated by the BSA to be about $15.5 
million at a rate of 52% (BSA, 2003). 
 
The world’s losses due to software piracy in Egypt are relatively low, when compared to 
the rates of other African and Arab countries. Table 3.1 shows the piracy rates and the 
dollar losses of different African countries in 2002-2003. 
 
Table 3.1: Rates and losses of software piracy in Africa 
 
 
Source: Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study, 2003. 
 
 
The losses due to software piracy in Egypt are relatively high. However it is obvious 
from table 3.1 that Egypt does not have a relatively high piracy rate when compared to 
many other African countries. Morocco and Nigeria for example have higher piracy rates 
Country Name  Piracy Rates 
 
Revenues Lost due to Piracy 
(1000) 
Egypt 52%  $15,566 
Morocco 58%  $4,449 
Nigeria 67%  $5,294 
Kenya 67%  $1,093 
Zimbabwe 70%  $807 
Other Africa  61%  $69,998 
Total Africa  48%  $144,370   - 11 -
but lower revenue losses resulting due to these rates of piracy. This means that a small 
piracy rate has major effects on the revenues of the transnational software firms in Egypt, 
unlike other countries that enjoy an even larger piracy rate but cause a minor loss on the 
revenues collected. This is exactly the reason behind the concerns of the transnational 
software firms investing in Egypt.  
 
The large rate of software piracy can be mainly linked to the relatively high prices of 
original software packages produced by the transnational firms (mainly Microsoft). 
During the last two years transnational firms agreed to offer some products at reduced 
prices for some segments of the societies, mainly universities and ministries. This is right 
after they have reached an agreement with the Ministry of Information and 
Telecommunication. Such an action decreased the rates of piracy in Egypt. (BSA, 2003) 
Nevertheless, the low level of enforcement mainly due to the insufficient work of the 
authorities responsible for combating piracy and the small finds imposed on accused 
pirates increased the likelihood of pirating. Pirates will always compare their high 
revenues with the low probability of getting caught and then choose to take over the low 
risk. Table 3.2 shows the number of pirated infringement products concerning computer 
programs and entertainment software caught by the Egyptian police and the inspection 
unit affiliated to the Ministry of Interior. 
 
Table 3.2: Number of pirated products 
concerning computer software in Egypt (1990-2002) 
 














Source : Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Culture, (Unpublished data), 2003-2004. 
 
As it is shown in the table 3.2, the raids on pirated software distributors and dealers 
became only since 1992 evidence. However, in 1994, not even a single pirated copy was 
caught. This can be linked to the fact, that before that time people were not very familiar 
with copyright laws protecting software products. Besides, the rapid increase in 
technology experienced by this sector in Egypt during the last 10 years facilitated the 
process of copying software. 
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The caught pirated products concerning software became only obvious, since the 
formation of the general authority of art police affiliated to the Ministry of Interior at the 
end of 1996. Thus, it is obvious from table 3.2 that in 1997 the number of pirated copies 
increased by 1960 copies. In 1998 it increased by 11000 copies than it doubled to reach a 
value of 36000 in 1999. By this time the Egyptian government started an anti piracy 
campaign and signed two important agreements with micro-soft to provide ministries and 
university students with cheap legal software to avoid copying the programs. Thus, in 
2001/2002 the number of pirated copies increased sharply to reach a number of 85,377 by 
the end of 2002. Yet, the increasing number of pirated software copies by the Egyptian 
police does not indicate that they are really fulfilling their job accurately. Interviews 
showed that the most dangerous pirates are still selling their products in popular places 
without fearing such raids by the police. Comparing the number of pirated software 
caught with the number of pirated Audio- or Videotapes, will give the impact that piracy 
in the field of software is negligible. But this is not true and these results can be linked to 
the fact that policemen and inspectors only raid the suspected sites of pre-reported pirated 
software. They do not surprise the dealers or companies when doing their inspections, as 
in the case of raiding the sites of pirated Audio- or Videotapes. (BSA, 2003), (Ministry of 
Interior, 2003) 
 
Experts stressed on the fact that weak enforcement of current copyright laws hinders 
inventions and investments in the field of software. Transnational firms will be reluctant 
to produce in Egypt, which will have a negative effect on FDI (IIPA 301 report, 2003). 
 
The first Egyptian copyright law of 1952 did not include innovative technology, such as 
software, databases or any other computer related applications. As early as 1985, Egypt 
was claimed as a copyright offender by the International Intellectual Property Association 
(IIPA), due to the several deficiencies of its copyright law. Thus, seven years later, Egypt 
finally passed amendments to its law in June 1992. Law 38 of 1992 is an extension of the 
first law and its several amendments to include for the first time innovative technology. 
Few enforcement actions were taken against large and medium-sized resellers and end-
users, which resulted in non-deterrent remedies such as a warning to legalize without the 
commencement of the necessary legal procedures against those companies involved in 
copyright infringement.  
 
Thus, it can be said that these amendments were ineffective and fell short of 
internationally- accepted standards. Police activity has targeted small resellers engaged 
mostly in selling compilation compact discs (CDs), and there has been little attempt to 
check resellers engaged in piracy through hard-disk loading. The lack of action by the 
police against hard disk loaders and end user pirates deeply curtails the effectiveness of 
anti-piracy efforts in Egypt.  The new amendments did not even consider the continued 
failing of the Egyptian government to revoke false licenses, which in effect blocks access 
to the market in Egypt for copyright industries (IIPA, 1994). 
 
Hence, in spring 1994, Egypt began a new enforcement campaign on resellers, who load 
the hard disk of computers with software without obtaining the necessary authorization 
from the software’s copyright holder. During 1995 and the first half of 1996 International 
Intellectual Property Alliance- (IIPA) members were really satisfied with Egypt’s 
progress, however enforcement activity and particularly the failure to impose deterrent   - 13 -
penalties (fines imposed are totally inadequate to deter piracy, between 1000– 5000 
Egyptian Pounds) have prompted IIPA to again focus on piracy issues in Egypt in 1997. 
During the second half of October 1997, Egypt reactivated raids on resellers and in 1998 
they also started raids on business end-users. In June 2002, the Egyptian government 
issued its new Intellectual Property (IPR) law. Law 82 of 2002 provides a firm basis for 
protecting copyright materials and author’s rights. The new law clearly extends the 
protection of copyright to the digital environment, including protection of temporary 
copies, broad exclusive rights of exploitation that appear to encompass digital 
communications and transmissions over digital networks, and attempted implementation 
of other key provisions of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
“Internet” treaties and the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
10 The increased activity of the 
software industry throughout Egypt has encouraged the authorities to take more actions 
against pirates, not only in major cities and towns, but also in remote areas. The Egyptian 
authorities should be encouraged to establish more efficient enforcement techniques to 
accelerate their own enforcement activities. 
 
Egypt was suffering from a software- piracy rate of 84%
11 in 1994. In 2002, Egypt has 
successfully reached a software-piracy rate of 52%. Thus Egypt was able to decrease its 
software piracy rate by 32% in 8 years. Table 3.3 provides a list of the best performing 19 
countries that managed to reduce software piracy during 1994-2002. Egypt counts as 
number four when compared with the rest of the world and counts as number one when 
compared with countries of the Middle East region regarding its reductions of software 
piracy rates. Studies by the BSA and the IDC showed that while Egypt reduced its piracy 
rate by 30% during 1996-2001, its software sector grew 160%, presenting the fastest 
software and IT growth in the Middle East region. 
 
Table 3.3: Cross country comparison for the best performing 19 Countries 
in reducing piracy rates during 1994-2002. 
 
Percentage Change 
in Piracy  Piracy rate in 2002
 





50%   36%  86%  United Arab Emirates 
37%  59%  96%  Slovenia 
33%  61%  94%  Guatemala 
32%  52%  84%  Egypt 
32%  42%  74%  Ireland 
32%  58%  90%  Turkey 
31%  59%  90%  Ecuador 
31%  45%  76%  Hungary 
                                                 
10 For further details about these two treaties, see IIPA, 2004 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, Egypt 
11 Piracy rate is measured by the BSA office by first calculating the number of legal software shipped by US firms 
minus the total number of total software used by PC users inside Egypt. This number is considered the number of 
pirated software copies. Then to be able to calculate the percentage rate of piracy this number is divided by the total 
number of software copies used and the results are multiplied by 100.   - 14 -
31%  35%  66%  Japan 
30%  34%  64%  South Africa 
30%  47%  77%  Spain 
29%  68%  97%  Salvador 
29%  48%  77%  Malta 
29%  43%  72%  Taiwan 
28%  61%  89%  Costa Rica 
28%  62%  90%  Croatia 
28%  25%  53%  Finland 
28%  36%  64%  Netherlands 
28%  50%  78%  Saudi Arabia 
Source: BSAARABIA (2002). Cross Country Comparison for the Best Performing 19 Countries in 
Reducing Piracy Rates During 1994-2002. Available at: ww.bsaarabia.com/bsa/press/pdf/bsa_issue_4.pdf. 
 
The enforcement procedure performed by the Egyptian authorities to protect the software 
industry included several actions. Egyptian authorities have enacted a number of laws 
and relevant regulations, for example, the new copyright law number 82 of year 2002. 
Besides, it has also established new enforcement authorities and organizations, such as: 
the new Anti-Piracy Police Department affiliated to the Ministry of Interior (1996-1997) 
and the Registration and Information Office (2003) that was established to combat any 
violations done using computer systems in Egypt. Different entities have participated 
with the Egyptian government to combat piracy; these are various organs of the Egyptian 
government as the Ministry of Culture and the Information and Decision Support Center, 
which reports to the Prime Minister’s office. Now, the IIPA participates in the 
enforcement process in order to achieve effective results.  Coordination between different 
organs of the Egyptian government has been achieved in order to increase public 
awareness.  
The Ministry of Culture worked in collaboration with the software industry on a public 
awareness campaign, which included an effective TV advertisement campaign against 
software piracy.  Several agreements have been signed to correct for the overestimated 
prices of software packages.  The Egyptian government and Microsoft signed different 
agreements in order to provide cheaper legal software programs for university students 
and governmental organizations and ministries. 
 
According to the New Institutional Economics, creating an efficient institutional 
environment requires establishing formal rules, informal rules and efficiently enforcing 
both. Enacting laws and regulations by the Egyptian authorities is considered a formal 
rule, while actions like coordination and signing agreements are supposed to change the 
norms of behavior of the people and maximize their utility as they will be able to buy 
cheap legal software, knowing all about the disadvantages of the pirated software. Thus, 
they are considered informal rules or ethics. While actions like: establishing new 
enforcement bodies and their collaboration with the Egyptian government involve legal 
enforcement. Accordingly, it could be said that enforcement does not only include the use 
of force and authority to apply the rules as it also requires changing the norms of   - 15 -
behavior and maximizing the societies benefit.  
  
Many Researchers have discussed the fact that it is more likely and more efficiently to 
enforce property rights and reduce illegal copying of software products through price 
reductions rather than through increased legal enforcement that implies more severe 
prosecutions. Thus, the sharp decline in software piracy (reaching a rate of 52% in 2002) 
experienced by Egypt could be mainly linked to the following key factors, depending 
mainly on price reductions: 
12  
 
The first factor is the agreement signed by the Ministry of Higher Education and Micro-
Soft. It implied the provision of cheaper legal software programs to university students, 
a fact that increased consumer utility. Second, is the agreement signed by the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology and Microsoft. It implies the utilization of 
cheaper legal software programs by public ministries and organizations since mid 2000, 
a fact that increased consumer utility.
13 
 
Second, the effect of media on public opinion concerning copyright piracy in general and 
software piracy in specific is also considered an important factor.  This factor helped 
increasing the public awareness concerning pirated software. Software users are know 
aware of the true danger of pirated software on the micro- (as the user might lose any 
information, when implementing pirated software) and macro-level (as it will have 
negative effects on the level of investment, employment rate, and the sector as a whole). 
In general, it can be said that software piracy in Egypt harms both US copyright owners 
trying to invest or sell their products in Egypt as well as the whole Egyptian economy 




3.2  Testing the Effect of Enforcement Efforts on Software Piracy in Egypt: 
An Econometric Approach 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the software piracy rate decreased significantly 
since the mid of the nineties. To evaluate the efficiency of the different enforcement 
efforts of the Egyptian government and to test their impact on software-piracy, an 
econometric model is defined and estimated. This is carried out using a two-stage 
analysis: In a first step, the effects of Egypt’s enforcement actions of the IPRs law on the 
level of software-piracy in Egypt are determined and tested. In a second step, the results 
are linked to the performance of the software Industry in Egypt using a correlation index.  
 
The first step is based on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis to test the 
effect of Egypt’s enforcement efforts on the rate of software-piracy in Egypt during the 
period 1992 - 2002
14. As before that time (1992) there was no law in theory to protect 
                                                 
12Personal communication of the author with Ms. Ghada Khalifa, head of the BSA office in Cairo. January, 
2003. For more details see: www.bsaarabia.com/bsa/press/pdf/bsa_Issue_4.pdf  
13 Offering the same product with different prices to different groups is also called third degree price 
differentiation. For more details about this issue, see: Shapiro, C. and Varian, H., 1998 
14 Frequency-Convergent method is implemented to transform the available set of low-frequency data into a 
higher-frequency set of data, using “quadratic-match sum’ type of frequency convergence.   - 16 -
software, thus a legal software market was absent in Egypt. Data concerning (2003) and 
(2004) are obtained using a different methodology. Recent studies by the BSA office 
reported that piracy rates in Egypt have increased once again and reached 69% in 2003, 
and 68% in 2004. The piracy rates, which had appeared in previously, released IIPA 
studies (1994-2002) were based on the older methodology, which is why they differ from 
the 2003 and 2004 figures percentages. The new methodology includes piracy rates of 
certain computer applications such as operating systems, or consumer applications such 
as PC gaming, personal finance, and reference software. These software applications are 
now included in the estimated 2003 and 2004 reports; and hence resulting in a 
significantly higher piracy rates (68%-69%) than was reported in prior years. Thus this 
figure will be considered doubtful, until they are confirmed by other sources. The 
Egyptian government defeated the claim of increasing piracy rates by saying that the 
main aim of changing the methodology applied by the IDSC, is to show an illusive 
increase in the prevailing software-piracy rates, in order to put more pressure on the 
Egyptian government to take a further step towards fighting software piracy and stronger 
legal enforcement of the IPR laws. 
 
The rate of software-piracy in Egypt will be the dependent variable and Egypt’s different 
enforcement actions will be the independent variables. There is no specific measure for 
IPR-enforcement. However, the level of enforcement depends on the factors that are 
responsible for creating an efficient institutional environment. Mainly during the period 
1996-2002 many efforts were undertaken by the Egyptian government to combat 
software piracy.  
 
Based upon several interviews with local prominent experts
15, three main actions taken 
by the Egyptian government concerning combating software-piracy are selected to 
represent the actual measure of enforcement.  The first action is increasing the number of 
raids conducted by the Censorship Unit affiliated to the Ministry of Culture and the 
Egyptian police to detect software pirates. The second action is establishing the Anti-
Piracy Police Department, affiliated to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 1996 to 
increase pirates probability of getting caught and punished and thus to increase their 
marginal cost. The third action is signing several agreements with Microsoft since end of 
1999 that include offering the Egyptian universities and ministries legal software at lower 
prices.  
 
The figures required to calculate the model will be provided mainly from the records of 
the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Culture. Piracy-rates of the Egyptian software 
industry will be obtained from studies conducted by the IIPA and the BSA. 
 
The estimated model is defined as 
(1)  ε α α α α + + + + = 2 1 ln 4 3 2 1 D D X Y , 
 
where 
                                                 
15 Personal communication of the author with General Salah Abdel-Fattah: head of the Anti-piracy Police 
Department, Ghada Khalifa, head of the BSA office in Egypt, Mohamed Hegazy: Intellectual Property 
Expert; IDSC, Saied Ismail ( the software chamber), Mahmoud Agami, Mounir Mansour: Inspectors 
working in the Censor Ship Department, Ali Abu Shadi (Cinema Chamber)   - 17 -
 
  Y represents the yearly rates of software-piracy in Egypt during 1992-2002. 
 
  X represents the number piracy-cases registered by the Ministry of Culture and the 
Ministry of Interior each year as an indicator for the degree of effort done by this third 
party (enforcement) during 1992-2002. The function includes log (x) in order to strike a 
balance with the left hand side of the equation, which is measured in percentage terms. 
Thus α2 = dY/dlog(X)   α2 = dY/ (dX/X). Accordingly α2 will measure the impact of a 
relative change in X on Y. 
 
    D1 represents the establishment of General Authority of Art Police at the end of 
1996. This Authority is responsible for enforcing the law, detecting piracy, and punishing 
who ever break the law. The establishment of this authority helped increasing public 
awareness regarding the negative effects of copyright piracy in general and software 
piracy in specific. D1 is a dummy variable, taking the values of zero in case this authority 
was absent, and the value of 1 otherwise. 
 
  D2 represents the existence of signed agreements between the Egyptian government 
and Microsoft in 2000, aiming at offering the Egyptian universities and ministries legal 
software at lower prices, to decrease the level of pirated software implemented by 
ministries and universities. This will be a dummy variable, taking the values of zero in 
case these agreements were not signed yet, and values of 1 otherwise. 
 
     That is, X, D1 and D2 are used as proxies for Egypt’s IPR-enforcement contribution. 
 
   ε represents all the other factors affecting Y, but were omitted by the model: It is 
the measurement error. 
 
3.3 Empirical Results 
 





) 38 . 8 ( ) 96 . 1 ( ) 4 . 4 ( ) 6 . 108 (
2 046 . 0 1 014 . 0 ln 009 . 0 216 . 0
* * * * * * * * * * − − −
− + − = D D X Y
 
 
The D-W statistic obtained by the model is about 0.60, indicating the existence of serial 
autocorrelation. This means, that the error terms of the variables of the model are not 
independent. This may be due to the existence of one or more important variables 
affecting the software-piracy rate but were omitted by our model. Three main factors that 
might influence the prevailing level of software-piracy but are not captured by the 
variables of the model representing the enforcement contribution of the Egyptian 
government are: the average income-level of pc-users in Egypt; biasness of the 
                                                 
16 Table output provided by e-views can be found in the Appendix, tables 4.2 and 4.3.  
17 ***, ** and * indicate a significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.   - 18 -
organizations measuring the rates of piracy; and the decrease in the price of CD-writers, 
which led to their quick dispersion. However as R
2  = 0.99, which means that 99% of the 
reductions in software piracy are due to the three chosen variables (X, D1 and D2), this 
leaves only an effect of 1% for all other factors omitted by the model. To acquire reliable 
results, the autocorrelation problem should be solved. Running the regression analysis 
after adding AR (1) and AR (2)
18 the following results were obtained: 
 
(3) 
( )( ) [ ]
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67 . 0 2 , 59 . 1 1 2 018 . 0 1 007 . 0 ln 009 . 0 21 . 0
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It can be said from the results obtained by the model that software piracy decreased due 
to the increasing enforcement efforts of the Egyptian government. However it must be 
said that the variable representing the signing of the agreements between the Egyptian 
government and Microsoft (D2) is the variable with the highest significance level. 
However taking the piracy rate of years 2003 and 2004 into consideration to see their 
impact on the variables of the model will violate some of the previously obtained results. 
The variable representing the establishment of the general authority of Art Police became 
insignificant, which means that it did not help in decreasing the software piracy rates. 
This fact supports the claims of the international software companies and the BSA office 
as they reported that the Egyptian police suffer from a lot of deficiencies and lack of 
experience in the field of intellectual property. 
 
In other words, it can be said that the results of the model after correcting for 
autocorrelation showed that all the three explanatory variables of the model are still 
significant, however the dummy variable D2 representing the signing of the agreements 
between Microsoft and the Egyptian authorities to offer cheaper software products is the 
variable with the highest significance level if not the only significant factor after 
including years 2003, 2004. This supports the previously mentioned assumption that 
price cuts are more likely to reduce piracy rates than the execution of more severe 
punishments alone. 
 
3.4  Linking Enforcement Efforts with the Performance of the Software 
Industry in Egypt 
 
When testing the relation between the level of piracy and the number of incumbent firms 
of the IT sector during 1995-2002, the following correlation-matrix was obtained: 
 
Table 3.4: Correlation coefficients between piracy levels 
and number of IT firms 
 
    Column 1  Column 2
Column 1 1  
Column 2 -0.944 1 
 
 
                                                 
18 Where AR(n) is an autoregressive equation that includes independent error terms (un) for quarter n.   - 19 -
Testing the relation between the level of piracy and the level of employment of the IT 
sector during 1995-2002, the following correlation-matrix was obtained: 
 
Table 3.5: Correlation coefficients between piracy levels 







Consequently, it can be said that linking the results of the model with some macro-
economic variables using correlation indices, showed a negative relation between the 
performance of the industry and the software piracy rate. Decreasing the rate of piracy, 
among other factors is important for the flourishing of the industry, as it gives a good 
image about the Egyptian software market which encourages FDI and encourages 
domestic producers to create in order to compete with the expensive software packages 
from abroad. Thus creating an efficient enforcement system becomes highly important. 
Enforcing property rights however does not only imply increasing the legal enforcement 
through imposing more severe punishments and prosecutions, as decreasing the relatively 
high prices of software plays a much bigger role.  In other words it can be said that 
increasing legal enforcement is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
decreasing piracy rates and hence stimulating the growth of the software industry. 
 
   Column 1  Column 2 
Column 1  1  
Column 2  -0.937 1   - 20 -
   4. Conclusion 
 
Software piracy in general has negative
19 as well as some positive
20 economic and social 
effects on the economy.  However it seems that the negative effects outweigh the positive 
ones. As a result, two main authorities were formed specifically to deter copyright-piracy 
in Egypt, which are the Anti-piracy Police Department affiliated to the Ministry of 
Interior and the Censorship Unit affiliated to the Ministry of Culture. In addition to two 
major decisions that were undertaken only recently by the Egyptian government to ensure 
the efficiency of enforcing copyrights concerning computer software. First, the Ministry 
of Information and Communication shall take over the responsibility of protecting 
copyrights concerning computer software. Second, a special unit for detecting computer 
crimes has been established in the information and registration office. This unit is directly 
affiliated to the ministry of interior. 
 
According to these efforts, Egyptian piracy rates have fallen beyond expectations, during 
1996-2002. The regression analysis carried in this study is mainly used to test the impact 
of property rights enforcement on software piracy in Egypt over the period 1992-2002. 
The model has omitted years after 2002, in order to obtain accurate results. The Piracy 
rates of these latter two years; were observed by the Business Software Alliance (BSA) 
using a different methodology than the one they used to use previously in order to put 
further pressure on the Egyptian authorities to impose more severe punishments and 
prosecutions concerning copyright infringement.  Egyptian IP experts consider these 
values overestimated and misleading as the Egyptian government has done lots of efforts 
lately in order to reduce the software piracy rates. 
 
Enforcing property rights however does not only imply increasing the legal enforcement 
through imposing more severe punishments and prosecutions, as decreasing the prices of 
software plays a much bigger role. This fact is supported by the results obtained by the 
model, which showed that the variables representing the legal enforcement of the formal 
rules by the Egyptian police (X, D1) are significant but not as strong as the dummy 
variable (D2) representing the signing of the agreements between Microsoft and the 
Egyptian authorities to offer cheaper software products. Thus, pricing a copyright product 
has proven to be the most important factor behind the prevalence of high copyright piracy 
rate. The existence of strong copyright enforcement has given the owners of copyrights 
extreme monopoly powers. A fact that has allowed many multinational firms, mainly US 
firms to overestimate prices and put strong pressure on many countries to reduce software 
piracy. Accordingly many countries were urged to shift from implementing the 
                                                 
19 Negative effects of Software Piracy: Diminishing dynamic efficiency, Local software industries crippled 
from competition with high-quality pirated software from abroad, High prices of software products, Lack 
of a legitimate market, Lack of secure legal software, and Lost tax revenues.  
 
20 Positive effects of Software Piracy: Software products sold at P = MC of producing an extra unit of the 
product, Network externalities, Increasing worldwide acceptance of the software brand and the spread of IT 
technology, and the emergence of new open-source software. 
 
   - 21 -
copyrighted software to implementing free open-source software
21. This fact has 
threatened the future of multinational firms investing in other countries.  
 
It must be said, that recent governmental efforts to combat software piracy have been a 
major success; however the concerned authorities responsible for enforcing the laws as 
well as the Egyptian judicial system should tackle piracy cases in a more serious way. 
They still need to acquire more knowledge concerning the importance of IPR protection. 
Hence public awareness and training programs should be increasingly designed for 
people working in this field including police officers and judges in order to create a more 
efficient enforcement mechanism. In addition, public awareness campaigns should be 
enhanced to pin point the negative effects of software piracy on the Egyptian society. 
  
On the one hand, the legal enforcement is considered to be a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for decreasing software piracy and hence for the flourishing of the 
software industry. On the other hand setting a fair price tends to be a sufficient condition, 
as the thesis argued. Prices should be taken into consideration when determining an 
optimal level of enforcement. These findings contradict most studies carried by the BSA 
office, which assert that sharp declines in copyright piracy can be achieved through 
prosecuting more severe punishments.  
 
Accordingly the government should try to tackle two main issues, when putting further 
policies to reduce software piracy.  
•  First: Determining a price ceiling for imported copyright products that suits the 
income level of its citizens and force companies to use third degree pricing strategies. 
•  Second: Taking the idea of implementing free open source software more seriously. 
The government should compare the resulting net benefits from implementing the Open 
Source Software on the performance of the software industry in Egypt with the ones 
resulting from enforcing property rights (through more severe legal enforcement and 
setting a fair price for legal software). 
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Background and Rationale of the Study: 
 
The field of Intellectual Property (IP) is sometimes described as a new branch, but its 
roots are actually quite old. In 1873, foreign exhibitors refused to attend the international 
exhibition of inventions in Vienna, because there was nothing to guarantee that after the 
exhibition their ideas will not be stolen, and exploited commercially in other countries, so 
they decided not to attend at all. The need for international protection of intellectual 
property became even more important when Johannes Brahms was composing his third 
symphony and Robert Louis was writing Treasure Island. (World Bank, 2001) 
  
All these previous examples are the output of human mind and intellect that deserve to be 
protected. As a result, two major treaties in the field of IP protection were adopted. The 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property on March 20, 1883 and the 
Bern Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works on September 9, 1886. 
The Paris Convention was the first major international treaty designed to help the creators 
of one country to obtain protection in other countries for their creations. (Moroney, 2003) 
The Berne Convention was to give the author or the creator of any work the right to 
control and receive payment for the use of their creative work. 
 
The Bern- and the Paris convention have established two separate bureaus to carry out 
administrative tasks. In 1893, the two bureaus united and formed together a unified 
bureau, called: The United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
(BIRPI) in Bern, Switzerland, with a staff of seven. This small organization was the 
procedure of World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) of today. WIPO is a 
dynamic entity located in Geneva with 177 member states, a staff of about 817 from 84 
different countries around the world, and with a mission and a mandate that are 
constantly growing. (WIPO, 2003)  In 1974, WIPO became a specialized agency of the 
UN system of organizations, with a mandate to administer IP matters recognized by the 
member states of the UN.  WIPO expanded its role and further demonstrated the 
importance of IPR in the management of globalized trade in 1996 by entering into a 
cooperation agreement with World Trade Organization (WTO).  The main aim of the 
WTO, is to promote creativity by protecting the works of the mind. This aim has 
continued to power the work of the organization for some 120 years, but the scope of the 
protection and services provided have been developed and expanded radically during that 
time. The need for international cooperation in the field of Intellectual Property increased 
rapidly, particularly with the pressure of growing international trade. WTO has 
constituted an Advisory Committee on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR), which has initiated a new approach to enforcement. This approach is for the 
member countries to focus collectively on the real challenges that all countries 
(developed and developing) face in implementing practical procedure for enforcing 
rights. The Committee also investigates the best practices and procedures that could be 
used to effectively enforce property rights, while keeping the time and cost burden at a 
minimum level. (WTO, 2002) 
Egypt was one of the first countries in the Near East and Africa to adopt a Modern 
Intellectual Property System. The Egyptian government adopted a modern trademark law 
in 1939, patent law in 1949, and a copyright law in 1952. All these laws have been 
superseded by law 82 for the year 2002. (Moroney, 2003)   - 26 -
The emergence of new open-source software:   
 
Small firms, many public organizations, even universities who are engaged in pirating 
software in Egypt and in many other countries are doing so because of the high prices of 
original software packages. This also applies also to developed countries. Accordingly, 
almost all high technology universities in Germany for example substituted the copyright 
software products with other open-source Software, which can be updated and 
downloaded for free. Any one can download open-source software from the Internet. 
(Davis, 2004) It can be said that open source software has fostered the growth of a 
worldwide community of developers contributing to the evolution and improvement of 
various software programs. Another advantage of open source software is the freedom to 
learn from other people’s techniques and strategies, which enables the user to focus on 
problem solving.  
  
Egypt’s agreements with Microsoft, which included offering the Egyptian universities 
and ministries copyright software at lower prices benefits Egypt as it saves a lot of money 
and still owns legal software. However Microsoft will benefit more, as it can guarantee 
that university students will not think about the open-source software and will remain 
users of the conventional copyright software. In the case of Vietnam (97% software-
piracy rate), Microsoft refused to do any price reductions, and under the terms of a 2001 
trade agreement signed with the Unites States, Vietnam is required to establish a much 
stricter legal enforcement system and more severe prosecutions, as to reduce its level of 
illegal software copying. At present, the Vietnamese government is significantly 
increasing its commitment to Open-Source software and, as the centerpiece of this anti-
piracy initiative; they are on their way to completely eliminate Microsoft. (Story, 2004) 
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List of Interviews: 
 
Name Occupation 
General Salah Abd-Elfattah  Head of the Anti-Piracy Police Department 
in Egypt 
Ms. Ghada Khalifa  Head of the BSA office in Cairo 
Mr. Mohammed Hegazy  Intellectual Property Expert at the IDSC 
Mr. Mahmoud Agami  Inspector at the Censorship Unit 
Mr. Mounir Mansour  Inspector at the Censorship Unit 
Dr.Nasser Gallal  Associate Professor of Economics, faculty 
of Commerce, Ain Shams University, 
Cairo 
Mr.  Amr  El-Nebeei  Manager of the EHE (Video-taping) 
Company 
Professor Mohamed Onsi  Prfessor  of  Mathematics,  Aachen 
University, Germany  
Mr Saied Ismail  Software chamber 
Mr Ali Abu Shady  Cinema Chamber 
 




Y  X1 D 1 D 2 
1992 0.90  3  0 0 
1993 0.90  3  0 0 
1994 0.84  4  0 0 
1995 0.84  3  0 0 
1996 0.88  2  0 0 
1997 0.85  26  1 0 
1998 0.85  85  1 0 
1999 0.75 170 1 0 
2000 0.56 250 1 1 
2001 0.58 709 1 1 
2002 0.52 1243  1 1 
2003 0.69 1808  1 1 
2004 0.68 2100  1 1 
Source: Ministry of interior, Ministry of Culture, BSA, 2002-2004 (Unpublished Data). Software-
Piracy rates are obtained from the global piracy reports published by the BSA and the BSA off ice in 
Cairo.  The number of software piracy cases (1992-1996) registered are obtained from the 
Censorship unit affiliated to the ministry of culture and the rest of the registered cases (1997-2004) 
are obtained by the general authority of art police affiliated to the Ministry of Interior.   - 28 -









































Dependent Variable: Y1 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/12/05   Time: 13:02 
Sample: 1992:1 2002:4 
Included observations: 42 
Excluded observations: 2 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.216156  0.001990 108.6448 0.0000
LOG(X1) -0.008992  0.002046 -4.395939 0.0001
D1 0.013570  0.006919 1.961256 0.0572
D2 -0.046501  0.005549 -8.380201 0.0000
R-squared  0.950032     Mean dependent var  0.191205
Adjusted R-squared  0.946087     S.D. dependent var  0.035696
S.E. of regression  0.008288     Akaike info criterion  -6.657559
Sum squared resid  0.002610     Schwarz criterion  -6.492067
Log likelihood  143.8087     F-statistic  240.8303
Durbin-Watson stat  0.594998     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000
Dependent Variable: Y1 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/12/05   Time: 13:01 
Sample(adjusted): 1992:3 2002:4 
Included observations: 38 
Excluded observations: 4 after adjusting endpoints 
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.213744 0.011905 17.95348 0.0000 
LOG(X1) -0.009376 0.002818 -3.327470 0.0022 
D1 -0.006680 0.003235 -2.065110 0.0471 
D2 -0.018277 0.003282 -5.569529 0.0000 
AR(1) 1.595581 0.129945 12.27890 0.0000 
AR(2) -0.675599 0.133838 -5.047888 0.0000 
R-squared  0.990651     Mean dependent var  0.187993 
Adjusted R-squared  0.989190     S.D. dependent var  0.036061 
S.E. of regression  0.003749     Akaike info criterion  -8.190592 
Sum squared resid  0.000450     Schwarz criterion  -7.932026 
Log likelihood  161.6212     F-statistic  678.1642 
Durbin-Watson stat  2.305660     Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
Inverted AR Roots     .80 -.20i     .80+.20i 